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The World Trade Organization(WTO) negotiations under theDoha Round are slowly pro-
gressing toward an eventual new
agreement on agriculture. A new
framework for the agriculture agree-
ment was approved by the WTO
membership in August 2004. The
changes in the guidelines for domes-
tic support could have effects on
many countries and many types of
support. However, details on the spe-
cific regulations of the agreement
have yet to be determined. Dramatic
reforms in agriculture could take
place under the framework, but the
decisions made to implement the
framework will determine if that po-
tential is realized. If countries lack
ambition and commitment to make
genuine reforms, changes in support
will not happen in this round.
Governments provide support to
agriculture in numerous ways, for
example, direct payments, research
grants, loan programs, and storage
programs to name a few. Under the
current Uruguay Round Agreement
on Agriculture (URAA), domestic
support programs are divided into
three “boxes” that indicate the trade-
distorting effects of the programs.
“Green Box” programs are consid-
ered minimally trade distorting. The
agreement sets out specific guide-
lines for the structure of such pro-
grams but does not set limits on
these program expenditures by WTO
members. “Blue Box” programs are
considered more trade distorting but
have production limits embedded in
them. These programs also are not
limited under the current agreement.
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All other programs are “Amber Box”
programs. Amber Box programs are
considered the most trade distorting
and are limited under the current
agreement. Within the Amber Box,
programs are classified as product-
specific or non-product-specific.
These classifications determine the
so-called de minimis rules, by which
certain Amber Box programs may be
exempt from domestic support lim-
its. Support that counts against the
limits is referred to as the Aggregate
Measure of Support (AMS).
THE NEW FRAMEWORK,
RECENT POLICY CHANGES,
AND WTO RULINGS
The newly agreed upon framework for
agricultural domestic support is tar-
geted at achieving substantial reduc-
tions in trade-distorting support, the
Amber and Blue Box programs. New
limits are put in place on de minimis
support, Blue Box support, and the
product-specific AMS. Total support,
as measured by the sum of AMS, de
minimis, and Blue Box support, is to
be limited. This limit on total support
will be tightened during the imple-
mentation period. All member states
face a 20 percent reduction in the to-
tal support limit in the first year of
implementation. This reduction is
referred to as the “down payment.”
Recent estimates indicate the United
States would have a total support
limit of $49 billion per year at the
start of the new agreement; a 20 per-
cent reduction would lower the limit
to $39 billion. Additional reductions
in the total support limit will be
based on a tiered formula that is yet
to be determined. However, the for-
mula will result in larger reductions
for WTO members that have higher
levels of permitted support.
Total AMS and de minimis per-
mitted levels will also be reduced
over the implementation period.
The agreement stipulates that prod-
uct-specific AMS and Blue Box sup-
port should only be capped, rather
than reduced. However, the frame-
work states that the required reduc-
tions in total support and total AMS
should also result in reductions in
product-specific support. The Blue
Box has been redefined to include
direct payment schemes that are ei-
ther production limiting or do not
require production at all. A member
state’s limit for Blue Box support will
be based on 5 percent of its average
total value of agricultural production
over a historical period or the
amount of existing Blue Box pay-
ments over a historical period, which-
ever is higher. Green Box guidelines
are to be reviewed to ensure that all
WTO SUPPORT CATEGORIES
Amber Box Support. Domestic poli-
cies that have a direct effect on pro-
duction and trade. WTO members
calculate how much support of this
kind they provide per year for the
agricultural sector (using calcula-
tions known as “total aggregate mea-
surement of support” or “Total AMS”).
Green Box Support. Measures with
minimal impact on trade, which can
be used freely. They include pay-
ments made directly to farmers that
do not stimulate production, such
as certain forms of direct income
support, assistance to help farmers
restructure agriculture, and direct
payments under environmental and
regional assistance programs.
Blue Box Support. Direct payments
to farmers whereby the farmers are
required to limit production. The
new framework would also include
direct payments based on a fixed
base that do not require production
in the blue box.
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insurance guarantee would remain
the same for farmers, this cost sav-
ings comes about with absolutely
no impact on the ability of the crop
insurance program to provide in-
come support when a farmer’s mar-
ket income falls short of the
insurance guarantee.
IS SMART REFORM DOABLE?
The word around Washington is that
departments and agencies are being
asked to identify perhaps 8 percent
of their budgets that can be cut. If
these cuts were to be made on a pro-
gram-by-program basis, then the
USDA’s Risk Management Agency
would be forced to cut projected
spending by 8 percent. Elimination
of optional unit coverage would ac-
TABLE 1. ESTIMATED CHANGES IN TAXPAYER COSTS FROM CROP INSURANCE
REFORM (FY 2006)
Current Program No Optional Units
(billion $) (billion $)
Total premiums 4.00 3.67
Total indemnities 4.30 3.95
Total premium subsidies 2.37 2.17
Administrative and operating cost 0.92 0.84
Underwriting gains 0.40 0.37
Taxpayer cost of crop insurance 3.99 3.66
complish this 8 percent cut in the
crop insurance program with no im-
pact on the total amount of insur-
ance provided to U.S. farmers.
Of course, the beneficiaries of
optional units can be expected to
fight their elimination. The primary
beneficiaries are crop insurance
agents, who will find that their com-
missions will be cut by about 8 per-
cent; crop insurance companies,
which will have reduced underwrit-
ing gains; and farmers, who will
have reduced payments. But if cuts
are going to be made, one would
hope that they are made with an
objective of doing the least harm to
the mission of the agency or pro-
gram being cut. Elimination of op-
tional units is the type of reform
that makes sense in an era of scarce
federal resources. ◆
Guns and Butter
Continued from page 3
Green Box programs are minimally
trade or production distorting.
Both the United States and the
European Union have significantly
altered their agricultural programs
over the last few years. They have
moved a great deal of their subsidies
to direct payments to agricultural en-
tities. The U.S. direct and counter-
cyclical payments and the E.U. Single
Farm Payments all fit the description
of direct payments. Given the current
structure of the Green Box and the
new definition of the Blue Box, U.S.
direct payments and E.U. Single Farm
Payments would be filed as Green Box.
U.S. countercyclical payments would
go in the Blue Box. These moves give
the United States and the European
Union a great deal of flexibility in deal-
ing with the proposed reductions.
However, the WTO panel ruling
on the Brazil-U.S. cotton dispute has
concluded that U.S. direct payments
“do not fully conform” to the guide-
lines for Green Box direct payments
because of their exclusion of fruit
and vegetable production on the
payment-base acreage. By the same
measure, E.U. Single Farm Payments,
too, would not conform to the
Green Box requirements. However, it
should be relatively easy to fix both
issues, so this is probably of minor
concern to U.S. and E.U. negotiators.
The framework explicitly states
that the reductions in total AMS per-
mitted levels “will result in reduc-
tions of some product-specific
support.” But true reductions may
not materialize because there are
loopholes in market price support
(MPS) programs, and member states
still have flexibility to provide sup-
port through other mechanisms. The
change in Japanese rice policy in the
late 1990s provides one example of
an MPS loophole. Another example
would be if the United States made
superficial changes to the dairy and
sugar programs to fulfill a target in
product-specific support reductions
without truly affecting actual sup-
port. The United States could also
lower loan rates in the marketing
loan program (reducing product-
specific AMS) and augment the
countercyclical program to make up
the support difference (by changing
the target price). Aggregate support
would remain the same but would
shift from the Amber Box to the Blue
Box. The ability of reductions in total
AMS permitted levels to force reduc-
tions in product-specific support will
also hinge on the product-specific
AMS limits. These limits have yet to
be determined, although the frame-
work does state that the limits will be
based on “respective average lev-
els.” To guarantee product-specific
support reductions, the final level
of total permitted AMS must be less
than the sum of the product-spe-
cific AMS limits.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
MOVING FORWARD
The issues embedded in the current
WTO agriculture negotiations are
numerous because of the multitude
of agricultural programs used by
member states throughout the
world. Putting all of the programs
into categories has allowed negotia-
tors and their advisers to condense
this support into manageable points
so that further clarifications can be
Continued on page 11
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made. Building on the framework for
agricultural domestic support, we
recommend additional changes.
The definition of Green Box poli-
cies needs to be re-examined. Given
the possible effects of decoupled
income support and marketing,
transportation, and infrastructure
support on world trade, these pro-
grams may not truly fit the Green Box
target of minimally trade-distorting
policies. However, these programs
are not directly linked to current
production or prices and may have
large non-agricultural benefits.
Therefore, leaving them in the Green
Box but tightening the rules for them
may make the most sense.
An initially generous Green Box
definition may facilitate negotiation
of a phase-out of the Amber Box poli-
cies, which are the most damaging
distortions. Developing countries
complain about the large expendi-
tures that sustain E.U. and U.S. farm
policies. As these expenditures take
place no matter what, competing ex-
porters would be better off with
Green Box types of policies than
with Amber Box policies. However,
this change would mean that net
food-importing countries would lose
access to cheap food. The export
subsidies that keep the costs of food
down would disappear with the Am-
ber Box. But trade would be undeni-
ably much less distorted.
The current AMS framework for
market price support cannot ad-
equately reflect actual support lev-
els. The MPS examples of Japanese
rice and U.S. dairy and sugar show
the flaws in current AMS calcula-
tions for these programs. Moving to
an AMS based on current world and
domestic prices will better capture
the actual level of support and align
market price support programs with
other Amber Box programs in which
actual expenditures are used in the
calculations. An alternative would
be to remove the MPS programs from
both the AMS limits and the current
AMS calculations. The way AMS is
calculated for MPS in the current
agreement has a significant loop-
hole, allowing the possibility that
countries can make small changes in
official policy (resulting in minimal
changes in agricultural trade protec-
tion) and provide themselves large
cushions from agricultural support
reductions. Either of the proposals
suggested here would close this
loophole.
Although the framework has pro-
vided the possibility for significant
agricultural trade reform in domestic
support, the Blue Box cap proposed in
the framework is so generous that
many programs could be folded into
the Blue Box with no effective change
in policy. Actually, the MPS loopholes,
generous initial AMS bindings, and
generous Blue Box caps taken to-
gether ensure that no actual change in
aggregate support would occur. As the
agricultural framework stands now,
actual cuts in support may well have
to wait for a third round of agricultural
negotiations, unless negotiators de-
velop a sudden desire for radical re-
forms. It may help to remember that it
took eight rounds of world trade nego-
tiations to get rid of trade distortions
in manufacturing.◆
This article was drawn from a larger
working paper of the same name.
The full text is available at
http://www.card.iastate.edu/
publications/synopsis.aspx?id=557.
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TABLE 2. U.S. HIGH FRUCTOSE CORN SYRUP CONSUMPTION BY TYPE OF USER (THOUSAND SHORT TONS)a
% change
Industry 1987 1992 1997 2002 1987-2002
Confectionery and related products 27 114 106 83 202%
Bakery, cereals, and allied products 411 442 402 513 25%
Ice cream and dairy products 402 568 772 258 -36%b
Canned, bottled, and frozen foods 593 647 502 686 73%
Beverages (mostly soft drinks) 3,888 3,878 5,845 6,693c 80%
Miscellaneous food manufacturing 101
Total 5,126 5,506 7,632 8,533 66%
Contribution of beverages to total
  HFCS consumption 76% 70% 77% 82%
Source: Calculated from U.S. Census Bureau data.
a For some categories and some years, the Census Bureau withholds data in order to avoid disclosing
information about individual companies or if estimates did not meet publication standards.
b The reduction in HFCS consumption by the ice cream and dairy products industry may reflect a change
in classification of the industry.
c Authors’ estimate.
